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Institutional Engineering,
Management of Ethnicity, and
Democratic Failure in Burundi 
Filip Reyntjens 
Abstract: This article argues that constitutional engineering along conso-
ciational lines in Burundi – explicitly accommodating ethnicity rather 
than attempting to suppress it – was instrumental in reducing the political 
role of ethnicity, but that other endogenous and exogenous factors also 
played a role. After surveying developments since 1988, this article fo-
cuses on the 2005 polls. The outcome of the parliamentary elections 
suggests that the “disappearance of the ethnic factor,” extolled by many 
at the time, was achieved by constitutional constraints rather than by 
social or political dynamics. Nevertheless, with regard to the country’s 
most important and lethal historical problem, the ethnic divide, constitu-
tional engineering has proved hugely effective. Burundi’s main cleavage is 
now between (and within) parties rather than ethnic groups, and when 
violence occurs it is political rather than ethnic. Burundi’s current crisis is 
therefore not a failure of consociationalism but of democracy. 
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The 2015 electoral period has created instability and violence in Burundi, 
but – contrary to what many feared – it has not led to the reappearance of 
ethnic strife, at least for the time being. This article argues that it is demo-
cracy, not consociationalism, that has failed. This is shown by examining 
institutional engineering over an extended period of time, beginning in 
1988. The article then highlights the effects of the 2000 Arusha Accords 
on both ethnic relations and democracy, along with the agreement’s 
translation into the 2005 Constitution and its implementation with the 
2005 elections. Later developments indicate a shrinking democratic space 
and increasingly poor governance, but the constitutional framework at 
the base of ethnic accommodation has proved remarkably resilient. At 
the moment, and contrary to the pre-Arusha past, conflicts are political 
rather than ethnic. In light of Burundi’s history, this is a major achieve-
ment of institutional design. 
Antecedents
Ethnic amnesia (Lemarchand 1992) characterised Burundi’s constitu-
tional and political dispensation up to the late 1980s. The ethnic issue 
was not addressed but ignored; indeed, it was forbidden to mention 
ethnicity. Just like in Rwanda since 1994, this served to hide the fact that 
power was exercised by an elite among the Tutsi ethnic minority. Nev-
ertheless, ethnically inspired violence cost scores of lives, particularly in 
1972 when the Hutu elites were decimated by a state-sponsored geno-
cide. Hundreds of thousands more fled into exile. 
This began to change after another round of violence caused thou-
sands of victims in August 1988, less than a year after Pierre Buyoya 
came to power through a military coup. Under considerable international 
pressure, he embarked on a policy of reform aimed at breaking the cycle 
of violence. Without explicitly saying so, he introduced a quota system 
that enabled the Hutu majority to enter the political scene. The intro-
duction of representational parity was to be the prudent beginning of the 
use of constitutional design to deal with the ethnic divide. 
Initial measures were informal. In the autumn of 1988, the Commis-
sion Nationale Chargée d’Étudier la Question de l’Unité Nationale (Na-
tional Commission to Study the Question of National Unity) and the cabi-
net each comprised an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi. For the first time 
since 1965, a Hutu became prime minister. Hutu were increasingly repre-
sented equally with Tutsi in most bodies of the state. However, the armed 
forces and the police and intelligence services resisted change, remaining 
predominantly Tutsi, a fact that became brutally apparent in October 1993.  
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These mechanisms were progressively formalised, particularly in the 
1992 Constitution, which called for broadly inclusive power sharing. For 
example, article 84 stipulated that “the government be composed in a 
spirit of national unity, taking into account the diverse component parts 
of the Burundian population,” a reference to the ethnic groups but also 
to regional balance. Likewise, article 101 required parties’ lists of candi-
dates for the parliamentary elections to be “composed in a spirit of na-
tional unity.” Such inclusivity requirements were incorporated in 12 of 
the 189 articles of the Constitution (Reyntjens 1992). Although the terms 
“Hutu” and “Tutsi” were not used, these provisions were clearly conso-
ciational mechanisms aimed at reassuring the minority Tutsi by offering 
them over-representation. 
The effectiveness of this constitutional design was put to the test in 
the elections of June 1993. In the presidential race, the challenger Mel-
chior Ndadaye won 65 per cent of the vote, versus 32 per cent for the 
incumbent Pierre Buyoya. Ndadaye’s party, the Front pour la Démocra-
tie au Burundi (Front for Democracy in Burundi, FRODEBU), captured 
71 per cent in the parliamentary elections, while the formerly single party 
the Union pour le Progrès National (Union for National Progress, 
UPRONA) managed a mere 21 per cent. In ethnic terms, the member-
ship of the Assembly was about 85 per cent Hutu and about 15 per cent 
Tutsi, which corresponded nearly perfectly to the demographic compo-
sition of the population. This confirmed Tutsi fears that democracy 
would transform the Hutu demographic majority into ethnic political 
domination. It also meant that even across party lines, Tutsi MPs could 
not secure a blocking minority of 20 per cent should they feel that a 
constitutional amendment threatened their vital interests. So the con-
sociational objective of reassuring the ethnic minority was not achieved 
(on the elections and their aftermath, see Reyntjens 1993).  
Ndadaye understood the discontent of many in the ousted politico-
military elite very well, and he attempted to alleviate their fears. For ex-
ample, although FRODEBU commanded an 80 per cent majority in Par-
liament, Ndadaye offered over a quarter of the positions in his cabinet to 
UPRONA, including the post of prime minister, to which the Tutsi 
technocrat Sylvie Kinigi was appointed. More than one-third of cabinet 
members were Tutsi. These concessions were to no avail, as during the 
night of 20–21 October 1993 army units carried out a coup without 
encountering resistance in Bujumbura. Ndadaye and some of his close 
associates were assassinated, others went into hiding. Violence erupted in 
the provinces, with tens of thousands of people killed in ethnic (Hutu vs. 
Tutsi) and political (FRODEBU vs. UPRONA) violence. The events trig-
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gered political stalemate at the centre, but also, and above all, the begin-
ning of a decade-long civil war. 
Arusha and Constitution Making 
In June 1994, former FRODEBU leaders who rejected attempts at ac-
commodation created the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Dé-
mocratie (National Council for the Defence of Democracy, CNDD) and 
its armed wing, the Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (Forces for 
the Defence of Democracy, FDD). Older rebel movements also again 
engaged in military operations. A “government convention” negotiated 
between FRODEBU and UPRONA in September broke down, and the 
army restored Buyoya to power through a coup in July 1996. As countries 
of the region imposed an embargo on Burundi, Buyoya was eventually 
forced to move towards negotiations with the opposition that started in 
June 1998, in Arusha, Tanzania, under the mediation of former Tanzanian 
president Julius Nyerere, succeeded after his death by Nelson Mandela. 
Pressure from the mediators and regional leaders eventually produced 
results in August 2000, when the Arusha Peace Agreement was signed. Its 
main provisions called for a consociational form of power sharing and for 
the deployment of international security forces. Most predominantly Tutsi 
parties among the 19 signatories agreed only reluctantly and expressed 
reservations about key provisions. They signed the accord, but did not 
embrace it sincerely. The rebel movements, all predominantly Hutu, were 
not involved in the talks and rejected the accord outright. 
The implementation of this weakly supported deal took several more 
years. The post-transition Constitution was approved by over 90 per cent 
of voters at a referendum held on 28 February 2005. Translating the prin-
ciples agreed upon in Arusha, it was markedly consociational (Sullivan 
2005; Vandeginste 2009, 2014), attempting as it did to combine majority 
rule with minority protection. This was achieved by trademark instruments 
of consociationalism, such as quotas, minority over-representation, and 
minority veto. The president, likely to be a Hutu, was to be seconded by 
two vice presidents, a Hutu from a mainly “Hutu” party and a Tutsi from 
a mainly “Tutsi” party. The cabinet was to be composed of 60 per cent 
Hutu and 40 per cent Tutsi members, and 30 per cent of cabinet members 
were to be women. In light of Burundian history, the posts controlling 
defence and public order were particularly delicate. Therefore, the Consti-
tution provided that the ministers for the army and the national police 
were to be of different ethnic groups. 
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The membership of the National Assembly was to also be 60 per cent 
Hutu and 40 per cent Tutsi. If this balance was not achieved through the 
ballot, the electoral commission was to ensure it by creating additional 
parliamentary seats and filling them with members of the insufficiently 
represented ethnic group – a process known as “co-optation.” A minimum 
of 30 per cent of MPs were to be women, and three slots were reserved 
for Twa (a group representing less than 1 per cent of the population), both 
goals to be ensured by co-optation if necessary. The Senate was to be 
composed of an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi, as were the army and 
the national police.1 
The Proof Is in the Pudding: The 2005 Elections 
As subsequent polls have been atypical, as explained later, the functioning 
of this institutional design will be checked here against the outcome of the 
2005 elections. This was an electoral marathon, with municipal, parlia-
mentary, senatorial, and presidential elections, but this assessment limits 
itself to the 4 July polls for the National Assembly, a process by and large 
considered free and fair by international and domestic observers (Union 
Européenne 2005; COSOME 2005). At the end of the process, including 
the co-optation process, the composition was as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Full Composition of the 2005 National Assembly 
Party Seats Seats by Ethnicity 
  Hutu Tutsi Twa 
CNDD-FDD 64 43 21 – 
FRODEBU 30 23 7 – 
UPRONA 15 – 15 – 
CNDD 4 3 1 – 
MRC 2 – 2 – 
(Twa) 3 – – 3 
     
Total 118 69 46 3 
The membership of 118 (up from the elected 100 members) met the 
constitutional requirements: 69 Hutu (60 per cent), 46 Tutsi (40 per 
cent), 36 women (31 per cent), and 3 Twa. Overall, the CNDD-FDD 
secured 54 per cent of the seats, a clear majority but by no means a blank 
check. Indeed, under the Constitution, a two-thirds majority was needed 
to pass legislation in a number of important areas (so-called “organic 
1  More details on the constitutional dispensation can be found in Reyntjens 2015. 
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laws”), such as defence and security. Amending the Constitution re-
quired a four-fifths supermajority. The CNDD-FDD would therefore 
need to develop post-election alliances across political and ethnic lines – 
an explicit goal of consociational design. 
In addition, the CNDD-FDD, generally portrayed as a “Hutu” 
party, emerged as the most interethnic, because nearly one-third of its 
MPs were Tutsi. By contrast, UPRONA and the Mouvement pour la 
Réhabilitation du Citoyen-Rurenzangemero (Movement for the Rehabil-
itation of Citizens – Rurenzangemero, MRC) confirmed their “Tutsi” 
nature, as no Hutu were elected on their lists. However, this apparent 
variation in the multi-ethnicity of the parties was actually the conse-
quence of constitutional design, not of political, sociological, or ethnic 
choices. Article 168 of the Constitution required that the lists of candi-
dates proposed by the parties in each province “be multi-ethnic in nature 
and take into account gender balance”: 
Of every three candidates proposed one after the other on a list, 
only two shall belong to the same ethnic group, and at least one 
out of every four shall be a woman.  
In addition, the closed-list proportional representation system precluded 
ethnic voting. Thus, while all parties proposed lists with mixed ethnici-
ties, it was the absolute number of seats they won per province that 
determined the ultimate ethnic distribution of their seats in Parliament. 
Because UPRONA failed to secure more than one seat in any province, 
it could elect only the top person on any provincial list, always a Tutsi, at 
the expense of Hutu placed lower on the lists. The two large “Hutu” 
parties – CNDD-FDD and FRODEBU – likewise typically listed Hutu 
at the top of their provincial lists (although the CNDD-FDD placed a 
Tutsi on top of its list in one province). Had these Hutu parties garnered 
only one seat per province, their parliamentary representation would 
have been almost exclusively Hutu. But because they won more seats per 
province, they had to delve deeper into their lists, which as required by 
the Constitution included Tutsi. Thus, the CNDD-FDD’s parliamentary 
delegation emerged as the most multi-ethnic simply because the party 
gained the most electoral support. Its victory was by no means evidence 
that Burundians voted for a party that was inherently multi-ethnic. The 
claim that Burundi’s election hailed the “disappearance of the ethnic 
factor” was therefore premature at best. 
The Constitution stipulated that the first post-transition president 
was to be selected by the National Assembly and the Senate sitting in 
joint congress, so this election became a mere formality. The CNDD-
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FDD held 96 of 166 seats (58 per cent), just five votes short of the two-
thirds majority needed to elect the president, so it was the only party to 
propose a candidate: Pierre Nkurunziza, its chairman. On 19 August, he 
was elected with 151 votes. Although the vote was secret, this over-
whelming support, representing 90 per cent of the Congress, revealed that 
some members of UPRONA and most or all members of FRODEBU 
and the CNDD had voted for him. 
Although there was some pre-election violence, the polls were gen-
erally considered as free and fair, and there was no violent backlash. This 
outcome, as opposed to the one seen in 1993, can be explained by sev-
eral factors. Constitutional design played a major role, as the Tutsi elites 
were now more reconciled to the victory of a “Hutu” party, in what was 
seen as a competition between the CNDD-FDD and FRODEBU. In-
deed, as some Tutsi leaders told me at the time, the 2005 electoral con-
test “was not their concern, but that of the Hutu.” The fact that pre-
election violence occurred mainly between these two “Hutu” parties 
demonstrates how the design contributed to a marked decrease in the 
salience of ethnicity. But the peaceful outcome of the elections also has 
other endogenous and exogenous explanations. In contrast to 1993, 
most leaders of the political parties and civil society in 2005 knew first-
hand the cost of civil war and so were willing to accept compromise to 
avoid its resumption. These leaders also learned during the transition 
period to work together and acknowledge the “other” ethnic group’s 
concerns. The hate media, so prevalent in 1993 and during the following 
years, had given way to (in part internationally funded) peace media. 
Finally, regional leaders and the international community played crucial 
roles. In particular, the preventive deployment of peacekeepers helped 
integrate former Hutu rebels into Burundi’s army, while greatly reducing 
the risk of a violent backlash from the army’s traditionally Tutsi officers 
and soldiers, thereby paving the way for the implementation of the peace 
agreement. The seemingly successful transition was therefore due to a 
unique combination of factors, but it was at the same time fragile, partic-
ularly with regard to its democratic component.  
Successful Consociationalism,  
Failed Democracy 
The CNDD-FDD consolidated its hold on power rapidly, and it did so by 
violating principles of good governance in ways that pervade much of 
Africa: committing financial abuses and engaging in corruption, as well as 
suppressing the opposition, the press, and civil society (Human Rights 
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Watch 2009, 2010). Lacking experience in running a state, the party re-
flexively embraced such anti-democratic practices, despite and sometimes 
in response to criticism from Burundi’s urban elites and the international 
community. Yet, the government retained popularity with its rural constit-
uents by providing social services, such as free primary education and 
healthcare for the most vulnerable. The former rebels’ long experience in 
the bush had attuned them to the needs of ordinary Burundians. 
Domestic politics became increasingly fragmented and partisan, often 
leading to institutional stalemate. The main schisms were not along ethnic 
lines, however, but between various “Hutu parties” (and even within them, 
but also within “Tutsi” parties), often arising more from personal differ-
ences than political ones. Howard Wolpe, the late US special envoy to the 
region, blamed all sides:  
The CNDD-FDD never fully transitioned from its status as a re-
bel group to that of a democratic political party. It has therefore 
carried its historical paranoia and authoritarian tendencies into its 
style of governance – intimidating opponents, harassing opposi-
tion political parties, torturing its political enemies. At the same 
time, the opposition parties were simply unprepared to accept 
their electoral defeat, regardless of the broad international consen-
sus that the elections were legitimate and an accurate reflection of 
popular sentiment. (Wolpe 2011: 62)  
Curtis (2013) finds one of the causes of this illiberal evolution in the 
contradiction between international rhetoric about peacebuilding, which 
emphasises liberal governance and inclusive participation, and narrower 
conceptions of peacebuilding that view its key goal to be the mainte-
nance of stability and control. Thus, encounters between international, 
regional, and local actors produced governance arrangements where 
violence, coercion, and militarism remained central. 
Despite this failure to develop a culture of democracy, Burundi’s last 
rebel movement, the Forces Nationales de Libération (National Liberation 
Forces, FNL), did register as a political party on 22 April 2009, belatedly 
formalising the end of a civil war after more than 15 years. Political activi-
ties during the remainder of 2009 and the first half of 2010 focused on the 
forthcoming second post-Arusha elections – municipal, parliamentary, and 
presidential – slated for mid-2010. The results of those elections – namely, 
the relatively peaceful but banal perpetuation of one-party dominance – 
highlighted again both the capabilities and limits of constitutional engi-
neering. Consociational guarantees had successfully diminished ethnicity as 
an electoral issue – no small achievement in light of Burundi’s history – 
but failed to produce better governance than in most African countries. 
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In the municipal elections of 24 May 2010, the CNDD-FDD received 
64 per cent support, with voter turnout at 91 per cent. Although interna-
tional and domestic observer missions noted a number of irregularities, 
they found the polls, by and large, to be free and fair. The CNDD-FDD 
won just 2 per cent more of the vote than it did in 2005, rather than win-
ning by a huge margin, which would have signalled manipulation. The 
geographic distribution of reported votes was also plausible, as other par-
ties won strong support among disgruntled residents of Bujumbura, while 
the CNDD-FDD enjoyed a landslide in the rural areas that were its base. 
Nevertheless, the losing parties claimed that the municipal elections were 
riddled with massive fraud, and a dozen of them established an opposition 
front called the Alliance Démocratique pour le Changement – Ikibiri 
(Democratic Alliance for Change – Ikibiri, ADC-Ikibiri), which boycotted 
the subsequent legislative and presidential elections. 
Nkurunziza was thus the only candidate in the presidential race to 
be determined on 28 June: a direct election by universal suffrage, unlike 
his indirect election by Parliament in 2005. Nkurunziza won 92 per cent 
of the vote, but the boycott suppressed turnout to only 77 per cent, a 
sharp decline from the municipal elections. Voter apathy grew even 
stronger during the parliamentary elections, on 23 July, when turnout fell 
to 67 per cent, and the CNDD-FDD garnered 81 per cent of the vote. 
Two of the other parties that had not boycotted also received some 
support: 11 per cent for UPRONA, and 6 per cent for FRODEBU-
Nyakuri, a splinter of FRODEBU close to the CNDD-FDD. To satisfy 
constitutional quotas for Tutsi and for women, additional appointments 
were made by co-optation, resulting in 81 seats for the CNDD-FDD, 17 
for UPRONA, 5 for FRODEBU-Nyakuri, and 3 for Twa, totalling 106 
seats. Due to the boycott, the CNDD-FDD obtained 76 per cent of the 
seats, exceeding the two-thirds supermajority needed for parliamentary 
votes on organic laws. Even more significant, by teaming with the allied 
FRODEBU-Nyakuri, the dominant party was able to surpass the 80 per 
cent threshold required to amend the Constitution. Thus, the govern-
ment now had the power to abolish the consociational guarantees for 
minority ethnic and political groups that were the basis of the Arusha 
Accords. The electoral boycott had thus weakened the balances en-
shrined in the Constitution, backfiring on the opposition. However, the 
CNDD-FDD was unlikely to tamper with the Constitution’s essential 
guarantees, even though the party did not participate in the Arusha talks. 
Indeed, the ruling party’s own Tutsi MPs and senators would oppose any 
such change that could reignite ethnic tensions, threaten vital Tutsi inter-
ests, and end their political careers. 
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The outcome of the elections and the opposition’s boycott cast a long 
shadow on political developments over the following years. The CNDD-
FDD gradually reinforced its stranglehold on the political landscape, as 
Burundi developed into a de facto one-party state. The maintaining of its 
maquis mentality and sense of being besieged by everyone and everything 
on the outside was proof of its inability to transition from rebel force to 
governing party. As early as 2005, and strongly reinforced after 2010, the 
CNDD-FDD put in place a system of patronage and violence that eventu-
ally covered the entire country. Several opposition leaders went into exile 
(though most returned). Civil society and the independent media were 
increasingly threatened, particularly by the intelligence service (Service 
National de Renseignements, SNR). Arbitrary arrests, “disappearances,” 
and extrajudicial executions were on the rise. Incipient rebel movements 
started operating, mainly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but 
their actions were no genuine threat to the regime. The Imbonerakure, the 
youth wing of the ruling party, increasingly engaged in violence against 
supposed opponents, but the latter, too, maintained a capacity for vio-
lence. Both the ruling party and the opposition thus contributed to in-
creased militarisation.  
Political tensions rose during 2014 in anticipation of the third post-
transition electoral round, scheduled for June–July 2015. While the 
CNDD-FDD’s announcement on 25 April 2015 that Nkurunziza would 
be its presidential candidate for an unconstitutional third term was the 
proverbial last straw, in reality the political crisis had begun well before 
then (Thibon 2014; International Crisis Group 2015; Nindorera 2015; 
Grauvogel and Simons 2015; Van Acker 2015).2  
Despite international condemnation, the splitting of the ruling 
party, the violence, the aborted putsch, and the fleeing into exile of hun-
dreds of thousands as a consequence of Nkurunziza’s disputed bid for a 
third term, elections went ahead more or less as scheduled, and the out-
come respected the institutional design. Since co-optation, the National 
Assembly has been made up of 60 per cent Hutu, 40 per cent Tutsi, and 
three Twa, and over one-third of MPs are women. The CNDD-FDD 
maintained its dominant position by capturing over 70 per cent of the 
seats. Nkurunziza was re-elected with almost 70 per cent of the vote, and 
the two vice presidents along with those elected to other government 
positions abided by the constitutional requirements. This was thus a 
remake of the 2010 electoral exercise, only worse, as the potential for 
2  The conflict around presidential terms limits is discussed by Stef Vandeginste 
(in this issue; Vandeginste 2016). 
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violent destabilisation was now far more serious, and as regional 
dynamics had entered into the equation. Most opposition parties 
boycotted the polls, though contrary to 2010 they had good reason to do 
so. The CNDD-FDD was the comfortable winner, claiming institutional 
“normality” and engaging in “business as usual” even in the face of 
international sanctions. “Business as usual” included major human rights 
abuses by the security and intelligence services (see, for instance, 
Amnesty International 2015). 
However, despite international fears of genocide and attempts by 
some players to inject ethnicity into the conflict, the consociational logic 
prevailed. Some Hutu and Tutsi sided with Nkurunziza, and some Hutu 
and Tutsi opposed him. The bi-ethnic army remained by and large united 
(although this coherence has come under increasing strain), and both 
Hutu and Tutsi were involved in the attempted coup, which was de-
feated by other Hutu and Tutsi. As the main divide and the violence 
remain political rather than ethnic, at least for the time being, the con-
stitutional engineering has proved remarkably resilient. As noted by 
Vandeginste (2015: 636), the pacification model has “prevented electoral 
violence from transforming into ethnic violence” (emphasis in original). 
But this achievement cannot be taken for granted. Just like ethnicity can 
be engineered away, it can be engineered back in, not per se through 
institutional means, but by political statements, insidious suggestions on 
the internet, or the redeployment of Tutsi officers of the former Forces 
Armées Burundaises (FAB), to quote just some examples of recent wor-
rying developments.3 
These dynamics show that while consociationalism has managed the 
ethnic divide up to now, it has not brought liberal democracy, good 
governance, or respect for human rights, and it has actually increased 
intra-ethnic tensions. Indeed, other lasting achievements of the Arusha 
Peace Agreement and the 2005 Constitution relating to legitimacy and 
democracy have not been observed. From a country constantly on the 
brink of massive ethnic confrontation and indeed genocide, Burundi has 
thus become a banal dictatorship characterised by standard conflicts over 
3  Monitoring of ethnically based hate speech by La Benevolencija Burundi found 
that about 38 per cent of such speech came from public authorities at all levels of 
the state, 25 per cent from opposition leaders, and 37 per cent from youth (20 per 
cent of youth were linked to the regime, 17 per cent to the opposition) (La Bene-
volencija Burundi 2016). A declaration by the CNDD-FDD dated 3 October 
2015, reacting to sanctions taken against individuals by the EU, contained nine 
references to ethnic groups, all suggesting that the EU measures displayed a bias 
against Hutu. 
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power, one that can be found in many African countries. In 2015 alone, 
Congo-Brazzaville and Rwanda introduced constitutional amendments 
allowing sitting presidents to run for additional terms, and South Sudan 
extended the tenure of its president, Salva Kiir, by three years. Ugandan 
president Yoweri Museveni was re-elected in early 2016 (term limits 
disappeared in 2005), giving him a fifth term in office, in addition to the 
10 years he was in power unelected. A little later, Djibouti’s Ismaïl Omar 
Guelleh ran for a fourth term, after having sworn in 2011 that his third 
was to be the last. At around the same time, Niger’s president, Mahama-
dou Issoufou, was re-elected after a campaign that his main opponent 
had to run from his jail cell. But these outcomes are not inevitable, as 
shown by the recent examples of Nigeria, Benin, and Cape Verde, where 
opponents carried the day and former incumbents graciously (though 
sometimes grudgingly) acknowledged defeat. 
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Institutional Engineering, Ethnizitätsmanagement und  
das Scheitern der Demokratie in Burundi 
Zusammenfassung: Der Autor dieses Beitrags argumentiert, dass verfas-
sungstechnische Maßnahmen in Verbindung mit konkordanzdemokrati-
schen Regelungen – die explizit Ethnizität berücksichtigen, statt sie zu 
unterdrücken suchen – in Burundi dazu beigetragen haben, die politische 
Bedeutung ethnischer Faktoren zurückzudrängen, dass dabei aber auch 
andere interne und externe Faktoren eine Rolle spielten. Er gibt zunächst 
einen Überblick über die Entwicklung seit 1988 und konzentriert sich 
dann auf die Wahlen des Jahres 2005. Die Ergebnisse der Parlamentswah-
len lassen darauf schließen, dass das “Verschwinden des ethnischen Fak-
tors”, das von vielen Beobachtern positiv hervorgehoben wurde, vor allem 
durch Restriktionen in der Verfassung und weniger durch eine gesell-
schaftliche oder politische Dynamik erreicht werden konnte. Nichtsdesto-
trotz haben sich die verfassungstechnischen Maßnahmen gegenüber dem 
größten und bedrohlichsten historischen Problem des Landes – der ethni-
schen Spaltung – als ausgesprochen effektiv erwiesen. Die wichtigsten 
Konfliktlinien in Burundi liegen jetzt zwischen (und innerhalb von) Par-
teien und nicht zwischen ethnischen Gruppen; wenn es zu gewaltsamen 
Auseinandersetzungen kommt, sind diese eher politisch als ethnisch be-
gründet. Die derzeitige Krise in Burundi ist daher kein Beleg für ein 
Scheitern der Konkordanzregelungen, sondern für ein Scheitern der De-
mokratie im Land. 
Schlagwörter: Burundi, Politisches System, Politische Partei, Wahl/ 
Abstimmung, Demokratiedefizit, Ethnizität 
 
